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ABSTRACT
Counterfactual thinking has been described by researchers as imagining alternative outcomes to a
previous event (i.e., how that event could have turned out differently). Research has shown
susceptibility towards systemic biases in this thought pattern. Specifically, these biases can
include racial prejudices, such as decision-making favoring one race over another, and attribution
errors, such as blaming a victim for an unfortunate circumstance. Research suggests that factors
that increase the use of heuristics lead to increased victim blaming, racially biased decisions, and
counterfactual thinking. The current studies suggest that counterfactual thinking has a positive
relationship with blame assignment and that both of these factors can be influenced by race.
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1

INTRODUCTION

The news is filled with discussions of “what if” scenarios across a variety of contexts,
including criminal activity and law enforcement interaction with the community. Of specific
relevance to the present study are crimes with relatively vague detail: what if he wasn’t wearing a
hoodie, what if he would not have looked so suspicious and avoided the altercation? Previous
research studies have examined this “what if” thinking in decision-making processes through the
study of counterfactual thinking (e.g., imagining alternatives for negative events). Counterfactual
thinking can have serious implications for subsequent judgments.
Counterfactual thinking involves using mental shortcuts in processing information, or
heuristics. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggest that these heuristics help people make
decisions in uncertain circumstances by reducing the required cognitive processes in order to be
more efficient. These heuristics fall into two categories: representativeness and availability
heuristics. Representativeness heuristics (e.g., the organization of objects in reference to others)
are based on previous experience while availability heuristics (e.g., mental shortcuts based on
immediate examples) are based on cognitive availability of information. The availability
heuristic was adapted to include the simulation heuristic as an explanation of phenomenon like
counterfactual thinking. Though heuristics can be helpful in making quick judgments, reliance on
heuristics, such as when using a stereotype, can lead to negative outcomes or judgement error.
One such negative heuristic discussed here is the Black male criminal stereotype, or the
association between Black men and crime. Previous research shows systemic biases in judgment
tasks when counterfactual thinking is used. Specifically, these biases can include racial
prejudices, such as decision-making favoring one race over another (Effron, Miller, & Monin,
2012), attribution error, such as blaming a victim for an unfortunate circumstance (Goldinger,

Kleider, Azuma, & Beike, 2003; Marques, Quelhas, Juhos, Couto, & Rasga, 2014), as well as a
host of other negative outcomes (Petrocelli & Crysel, 2009; Petrocelli, Seta, Seta, & Prince,
2012). Niemi and Young (2016) argued that this tendency to blame the victim is based on one’s
own moral values that control one’s attitudes towards victims. Specifically, moral values can
influence judgments of a victim’s responsibility, which in turn influences how much blame is
ascribed to a victim (Niemi & Young, 2016). Goldinger et al. (2003) suggested that this victim
blaming could be caused by factors such as cognitive load (e.g., limiting cognitive capacity) and
counterfactual thinking. Kleider, Knucky, and Cavrack (2012) found that when cognitive
resources were limited due to a cognitive load, people made more racially biased jury decisions
compared to when processing resources were not restricted. Limiting cognitive processing
increased reliance on heuristic processing and thus racial biases.
The current study was designed to investigate 1) the extent to which the Black male
criminal stereotype (BMC) facilitates counterfactual thinking in an ambiguous scenario leading
to biased decision-making, 2) whether reduced cognitive resources facilitate or exacerbates this
effect, and 3) whether facial expression can modulate those relationships. Previous research on
face biases and the Black male criminal stereotype suggests the perception of stereotypically
African American facial features (e.g., skin tone, wide nose, etc.) are more readily associated
with crime than are their perceived non-stereotypical counterparts (Blair, Judd, & Chapleau,
2004). However, other research by Kubota and Ito (2014) found that Black male faces with
positive expressions lead to less reliance on the Black male criminal stereotype in a decisionmaking task. Therefore, I also investigated the modulating effect of facial expressions on the use
of these negative stereotypes.

The research objective for this project was to examine whether counterfactual thinking is
facilitated by reliance on activation of the BMC stereotype. If the BMC stereotype aids in the
shortcut to decision-making, is the resultant decision more likely to be counterfactual (e.g.,if
only he had been in school he would not have been hit by the car) than if the stereotype were not
activated (e.g., the driver was not paying attention)? In addition, are factors that deemphasize the
use of BMC, such as reduced cognitive load or positive facial expression, likely to reduce
reliance on counterfactual thinking? Factors that may influence the likelihood of using a
heuristic, limited cognitive capacity (cognitive load) and facial expression will be tested as
modulating factors of blame.

1.1

Counterfactual Thinking
The beginnings of the study of counterfactual thinking are often attributed to Kahneman

and Tversky (1982) and their idea of the simulation heuristic. According to the simulation
heuristic, how people determine the likelihood of an event is directly related to how easy that
event is to imagine happening. The classic example of this heuristic from Kahneman and
Tversky (1982) is their proposed scenario in which two men, while riding together to an airport,
become stuck in traffic and subsequently miss their flights. Although both men miss their flights
in the scenario, the reader is told that the first man missed his by 30 minutes and the second by
only 5. The reader is then asked who would be more upset, the first or second man? Most readers
say the second man, who only missed his flight by 5 minutes. Readers rationalize this because it
is easier to picture the second man making his flight on time, as he only missed it by 5 minutes.
The structure of a counterfactual thought according to a review by Roese and Olson
(1995) can include imagined outcomes that are better (upward counterfactuals) or worse

(downward counterfactuals) than the current situation or scenario as well as add, subtract, or
substitute information. These imagined outcomes can include the person (self-referent), another
(other-referent) or can be attributed to a situation instead of a person (nonreferent). A possible
relevant body of literature to this attribution of imagined outcomes in the fundamental attribution
error, or the tendency attribute the behavior of others to personal rather than situational factors
(Ross, 1977). With this theory in mind, it is possible that people engaging in counterfactual
thought may be more likely to attribute others behavior to a personal cause, though there is no
research specific to this relationship at present. Counterfactual thinking is often self-referent and
salient personal scenarios are more likely to encourage this self-referent counterfactual thought
(Roese and Olson, 1993). These counterfactual thoughts have been measured in previous
research using multiple methods including both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The
qualitative methods often involve asking participants to list counterfactual thoughts (Roese &
Olson, 1993) or asking participants to “think out loud” (Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, &
McMullen, 1993). Quantitative methods are more commonly used, often presenting a participant
with vignettes or direction to recall a memory, then having the participant respond on a Likert
scale to assess endorsement of counterfactual thinking responses (Boninger, Gleicher, &
Strathman, 1994; Macrae & Milne, 1992; Rye, Cahoon, Ali, and Daftary, 2008; Turley, Sanna, &
Reiter, 1995).
Counterfactual thinking can lead to decision-making strategies that are not likely to lead
to better situational outcomes. Petrocelli, Seta, Seta, and Prince (2012) examined the positives
and negatives of counterfactual thinking in academic performance. An example of an upward
counterfactual thought presented would be “if only I had studied more, I would have gotten a
better grade” which was hypothesized to lead to more studying in the future. However, the

authors found participants were more likely to use counterfactual thinking to explain away
academic failures, attributing them to contextual factors like test difficulty, thus inhibiting
effective study patterns (Petrocelli et al. 2012). Negative outcomes of counterfactual thinking are
demonstrated in different contexts that include racial prejudices, such as decision making
favoring one race over another (Effron, Miller, & Monin, 2012), poor academic performance
(Petrocelli, Seta, Seta, & Prince, 2012), memory distortion (Petrocelli & Crysel, 2009), and
attribution error, such as blaming a victim for an unfortunate circumstance (Goldinger, Kleider,
Azuma, & Beike, 2003; Marques, Quelhas, Juhos, Couto, & Rasga, 2014). Goldinger et al.
(2003) found that when cognitive capacity was limited by a cognitive load, participants with low
working memory capacity relied more heavily on racially biased counterfactual thinking. This
reduction of cognitive capacity further facilitates the use of heuristics in decision-making. These
mental short cuts provide a way to process information quickly when cognitive capacity is
limited, therefore reducing the cognitive capacity needed (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
1.1.1 Counterfactual Thinking as an Automatic vs Controlled Process
Research by Roese and Olson (1997), suggested that counterfactual thinking is typically
an automatic process that is associated with a negative event. When a target outcome is not met,
the response to this negative event is to automatically mentally picture the desired target outcome
and how it could have come about (Roese & Olson, 1997). However, a later work from Roese,
Sanna, and Galinsky (2005) argued that counterfactual thinking can be both automatic or
controlled based on the necessity of the task at hand. Specifically, they argued that counterfactual
thinking can be automatic in that it is activated unconsciously by certain situations, but it can
also be deliberately recruited or suppressed in other situations (Roese et al., 2005). When
counterfactual thoughts are automatic, it is often in response to a spontaneous negative event

(e.g., a car accident) while controlled counterfactual thoughts are usually the result of monitoring
ongoing goals (e.g., improving bad grades) (Petrocelli et al. 2012; Roese et al., 2005).
1.1.2 Counterfactual Thinking and Blame
Previous research has examined how counterfactual thinking influences blame
assignment in a host of contexts such as outcome variability (Alicke, Buckingham, Zell, &
Davis, 2016), social norms (Catellani, Alberici, & Milesi, 2016), in-group versus out-group
membership (McCrea, 2007), and unfortunate events (Goldinger, et al., 2003). Niemi & Young
(2016) argued that this tendency to assign blame to a victim is based on one’s own moral values
on behaviors that harm others that control their attitudes towards victims. Specifically, moral
values about appropriate behavior influence judgments of a victim’s responsibility, which in turn
influences how much blame is ascribed to a victim (Niemi & Young, 2016). Goldinger et al.
(2003) suggested that this tendency to victim blame could be caused by a series of factors such
as memory load and counterfactual thinking.
1.1.2.1 Moral versus Legal Blame
The philosophical argument around the relationship between law and morality goes back
to Aristotle c. 350 B.C.E. The disconnect between these two constructs can be seen in the classic
conundrum of a man who steals a loaf of bread to feed his starving family. Most people agree
that the man is legally wrong for stealing, however the act is seen as morally permissible.
Though in the previous scenario the two constructs diverge, Wikström and Treiber (2007)
suggest that, in general, a behavior that is considered illegal is often considered immoral. If that
is the case, does the law and morality diverge in our current legal system? More recent research
has focused on the disconnect between individual actions and behaviors through Belief Behavior
Incongruence (Vogel & Fradella, 2012). Vogel and Fradella (2012) found their participants

would deem behaviors such as speeding immoral and illegal; however, they would readily admit
to engaging in this behavior. One theory presented by the authors was that the punishment for
engaging in the behavior and the likelihood of being caught was not enough to deter it. This
finding suggests that while a behavior might be viewed as severely morally wrong, it might be
considered less so legally, as people are still willing to engage in the behavior (Vogel & Fradella,
2012).
1.2

The Black Male Criminal Stereotype
Stereotypes are a kind of availability heuristic based on societal beliefs. Secord and

Backman (1964) define stereotyping as a process involving categorization of individuals or
groups according to some set of attributes, consensus as to what those attributes are, and
discrepancies between the attributed and actual traits of the person or group involved.
Stereotypes have been further described in previous research as beliefs held about a social
group’s attributes or behavior that are often negative and can be false (Fiske, 1998). A prevalent
stereotype is the Black male criminal stereotype. A myriad of research has shown this
association between Black males and perceived criminality (see Correll, Park, Judd, &
Wittenbrink, 2002; Blair, Judd, & Chapleau, 2004; Kleider, Knuycky, & Cavrak, 2012).
Research by Dixon and Linz (2000a, 2000b) suggested that this representation of Black males as
perpetrators of crime may be perpetuated by the media. This association between Black males
and crime is also evident in jury decision-making scenarios wherein Black men, compared to
White men, are given harsher sentences for violent crime when crime type was consistent with
the participants expectations (Jones & Kaplan, 2003). This stereotype is also evident in
sentencing, specifically death penalty sentencing in which the perpetrator looks to be a

steretypical example of a Black male (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006;
Blair, Judd, & Chapleau, 2004).
This bias is not restricted to adults. Todd, Thiem, and Neel (2016) found similar biases
about Black males as young as five years old. Specifically, their study tested the idea of
associations between race and threat and found that faces of African American males as young as
age five primed the detection of threat-related objects. Similarly, Goff, Jackson, Di Leone,
Culotta, and DiTomasso (2014) found that assumptions of childhood innocence were less likely
to be applied to Black children than White children.

1.2.1

The Black Male Criminal Stereotype and Face Bias

The heuristic nature of the Black male criminal stereotype is especially evident in face
perception. Feature-based judgments about character are rooted in stereotypes (Lippman, 1922).
Research suggests there are stereotypical facial features associated with Black men (e.g., skin
tone, wide nose, etc.), upon which they can then be categorized onto a spectrum from “atypical”
to “prototypical” representation (Blair et al., 2004; Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004;
Knuycky, Kleider, Cavrak, 2014), and this stereotypical face-type is associated with negative
outcomes (Blair et al., 2004). Blair et al. (2004) found that Black men with more stereotypically
African American facial features received harsher sentences for similar crimes than those who
had less stereotypical facial features. This association of stereotypical face-type and negative
outcomes extends to memory error, as Kleider et al. (2012) found that stereotypically Black faces
were more often misremembered as criminals than were atypically Black faces. It follows that
stereotypes are activated by face-type and then used to judge and make decisions about people.
Based on these negative stereotypes regarding the association between Black males and crime, as

well as their negative representation in media (Dixon and Linz, 2000a,b), prototypical Black
male faces may activate this simulation heuristic (and further counterfactual thinking) in which
they are easily pictured as criminals relative to those with less prototypical features.
However, other research has examined ways in which this association may be modulated
by other factors. Blair (2002) suggested that these automatic stereotypes and associated
prejudices might be malleable. Livingston and Pearce (2009) found that certain facial features,
specifically more baby-faced features, might reduce the perception of threat of a Black male
face. Related to implicit bias, Kubota and Ito (2014) found that Black male faces with positive
expressions lead to less stereotyping in a masked priming weapon identification task. Though
there are few studies regarding facial expression and implicit biases, previous research shows
that generally happy faces suggest more positive outcomes such as affiliation and
approachability (see Hess, Blairy, & Kleck, 2000; Miles, 2009; Willis, Palermo, & Burke, 2011).
Studies such as these suggest that activation of the Black male criminal stereotype may be
exacerbated by some manipulations; others may also attenuate it.
1.2.2

The Black Male Criminal Stereotype and Cognitive Capacity

Additionally, when cognitive resources are reduced, people more often use short cuts in
decision-making as fewer cognitive resources are required. Unfortunately, this can lead to
reliance on stereotypes that may negatively impact Black men. For example, Kleider et al. (2012)
found that participants assigned more guilt to a Black defendant than to a White defendant under
memory load suggesting that participant’s ability to monitor responses required unavailable
cognitive capacity. Research also suggests that counterfactual thinking can be influenced by
cognitive load manipulations that may constrain a participant’s ability to monitor their responses
(Goldinger et al., 2003). Specifically, Goldinger et al. (2003) found that participants under

cognitive load were more likely to engage in counterfactual thinking and blame the victim for an
unfortunate circumstance. Previous research also suggests individual differences in response to
cognitive load manipulations based on working memory capacity (WMC), such that low WMC
individuals are less successful at tasks inducing cognitive load (Goldinger et al., 2003). Based on
these findings, cognitive load and other manipulations related to cognitive capacity can limit the
effectiveness of cognitive processing of information. When this limiting of cognitive capacity
occurs, individuals may be more inclined to rely on heuristic processing and thus racial biases.

1.3

Purpose for the Study
The current overall study was designed to investigate the influence of counterfactual

thinking and the Black male criminal stereotype in decision-making in crime scenarios (created
for the purpose of this study). Study 1 sought to examine the influence of counterfactual thinking
and BMC stereotype in scenarios where participant cognitive capacity was limited. Study 2
included images of faces in an attempt to modulate reliance on the BMC stereotype in the same
scenarios.
1.3.1 Pilot Study
A pilot study was conducted with the purpose of assessing stimuli created for this study
(scenarios for all studies and pictures for Study 2), questions created for this study, and assess the
necessity for multiple outcomes and predictor variables. Scenarios were chosen based on
participant ratings of the outcome variables when no race was included. Faces were chosen for
Study 2 based on participant ratings for the desired traits (e.g., perceived race, valence of face,
and age of face). Reporting of questions created for the study (individual vs aggregated scores)
was determined.

1.3.2 Study 1: Cognitive Load
The purpose of Study 1 was to examine whether counterfactual thinking is a default
decision making strategy, and whether it occurs more often when race is a salient factor in an
ambiguous scenario. During Study 1, all created crime scenarios were randomly assigned to a
cognitive load manipulation to increase the difficulty of using controlled processes used for
decision monitoring. Moreover, individual differences in working memory capacity were also
assessed to examine whether some individuals are more vulnerable to biased decision making
under constrained cognitive resources based on the work of Goldinger et al., 2003. The
hypothesis of this study was that victim race, propensity for counterfactual thinking, and
cognitive capacity (and subsequent load manipulations) would impact the blame assigned to the
victim in the scenario. Specifically, that participants under cognitive load would be more likely
to endorse questions ascribing counterfactual thought as well as more likely to assign blame
based on the race of the person in the scenario.
1.3.3 Study 2: Facial Cues
Study 2 included the presentation of face photos in an effort to modulate heuristics
related to criminality. The prediction for Study 1 was that propensity for counterfactual thinking
and cognitive load would lead to the use of this Black male criminal stereotype, which would in
turn result in more blame being assigned based on the race of the victim. However, Study 2 was
designed to examine the effect of facial expression in this paradigm. Previous research suggests
that positive facial expressions may modulate some negative stereotypes. Kubota and Ito (2014)
found that Black male faces with positive expressions lead to less stereotyping in a weapon
identification task. Study 2 was designed to replicate this association between positive facial
expressions and the reduction of reliance on stereotypes. It was hypothesized that prime race,

prime valence, and propensity for counterfactual thinking (both generally and task specific)
would impact the blame assigned to the victim in the scenario. Specifically, that happy faces
would receive less blame regardless of race and that happy Black faces would receive the same
amount of blame as White or Racially ambiguous faces.

2
2.1

PILOT STUDY

Methods
Participants
The participants included Georgia State University undergraduate students, with a subset

of 20 rating the scenarios, 20 rating the faces, and 71 rating the scenarios with the victim race
manipulation included. All the students participated for course credit and self-reported their age
[range = 18-60 years with majority (85%) between 18-24], gender (69% female, 30% male, 2%
non-binary), and race (30% African-American, 35% Caucasian, 15% Asian, 10% Bi/Multi
Racial, 10% Latino/a/x, & 5% Other races).
Materials
Crime Scenarios. 16 written scenarios were created for the purpose of this study. In all of
these scenarios, a racially identified (Black, White, unknown) youth (e.g., teenager committing
the act) committed a minor criminal infraction (e.g., loitering) and a security guard responded by
shooting and seriously injuring the youth. The scenarios were created to be intentionally
ambiguous, providing no information following the altercation involving the teen and security
guard. Each scenario was a similar word length (between 115-130 words) and was created to
include four pieces of ambiguous information. Though these scenarios were not real cases, all of

the crimes listed were included in the top 25 most common crimes, offenses and violations for
the teen age group according to the Global Youth Justice statistics (2020).
Outcome Questions. Participants were asked if the youth in the scenario was morally or
legally responsible for the outcome of the scenario (above) using agreement to the statements on
a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) Likert scale. The questions were assessed to
determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the two questions.
Specific Counterfactual Questions. Questions ascribing counterfactual thought specific to
the scenarios were presented after each scenario (i.e., “If only the youth had behaved differently,
the outcome would not have happened”; “If only the situation had been different, the outcome
would not have happened”) to which participants responded on a 1 to 7 Likert scale (1= Strongly
Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). The questions were assessed to determine if they were
statistically significantly different (therefore requiring separate analysis and reporting) or not, in
which case the scores would be reported in aggregated form.
Face Stimuli for Study 2. A total of 45 images of faces of young Black, White and
racially ambiguous males with positive and neutral facial expressions were sourced via Internet
search of yearbooks for the purpose of this study. These faces were then pre-rated using 1 to 7
Likert scales for estimated age, face valence (happy, neutral, or negative), and assumed race. All
faces were cropped to head and shoulder were presented in color, forward facing, and on a
neutral background. These faces were only presented in Study 2.
Procedure
Participants rating faces or scenarios viewed the stimuli on a computer.
Participants completing the task viewed on a computer, a series of scenarios in which the
teen was labeled as Black, White, or racially unidentified (either no race present or the word

“unknown”). Scenarios were presented randomly. Participants made 1 to 7 Likert scale
judgments of how much moral and legal responsibility for the altercation that the teen should
bear. Lastly, participants were asked for demographic information: gender and ethnicity,
indicated via key press. Participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

2.2

Results (Pre-Ratings)
Data Cleaning. Three “catch” questions were randomly inserted throughout the task to

ensure that participants who could not be monitored while completing the task were paying
attention (e.g., “Answer Strongly Agree to this question”). Participants who did not answer all
three questions correctly were removed from the analyses.
Crime Scenarios. A mean rating for blame assigned of 3.32 was calculated for all
outcome variables on all of the scenarios with a standard deviation of 0.42. Scenarios were
included in further studies that fell within one standard deviation of the mean. Any possible
remaining differences were controlled for in future liner mixed model analyses. See Figure 1 for
a list of scenarios included in the study.
Outcome Questions. A paired samples t-test was conducted to compare the blame
assigned to the victim when the question was phrased as “morally” or “legally” responsible for
the outcome of the scenario. Overall, there was a significant difference in the scores based on the
phrasing of the question: morally (M = 4.10, SD = 1.05) and legally (M = 3.93, SD = 1.06)
responsible conditions; t(71) = 3.55, p = < .001. Therefore, further analyses included these two
outcome variables separately.
Specific Counterfactual Questions. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was
conducted in order to determine whether the specific counterfactual questions created for the

purposes of this study (i.e., “If only the youth had behaved differently, the outcome would not
have happened”; “If only the situation had been different, the outcome would not have
happened”; “If only the youth had looked different, the outcome would not have happened”)
were statistically significantly different from one another. There was a statistically significant
difference between responses on the three questions, F(2,70) = 11.97, p = <.001. A Tukey post
hoc test revealed that the counterfactual question responses regarding appearance were
statistically different from the behavior (-0.54, p = .002) and situational (-0.73, p = <.001)
questions. There was no statistically significant difference between the behavioral and situational
question responses (p = .390). The differences regarding the appearance question could be the
result of the pilot test (and subsequently Study 1) not including an image with the scenario.
Therefore, the appearance question was only included and analyzed with Study 2. The other two
questions were aggregated.
Face Stimuli. The faces were narrowed down to include 14 possible images presented to
participants as a result of the pilot. All faces had to be rated high (at least 1 standard deviation
above the mean) to be included in a particular category (e.g., Black, White, ambiguous, happy,
neutral). The scores for the overall list of faces are available in Table 1 and the selected faces and
their respective scores are available in figure 2. Of these photos, two positive and two neutral
expression faces for each of the race categories (e.g., Black, White, racially ambiguous) were
included in the stimulus set. See Figure 2 for the final images chosen for this study.

3

STUDY 1

As mentioned, previous researchers have found individual differences in response to
cognitive load manipulations based on working memory capacity (WMC), such that low WMC
individuals are less successful at tasks inducing cognitive load (Goldinger et al., 2003). The
purpose of this study was to replicate the findings of Goldinger et al. (2003) by examining
whether participants are more likely to assign blame based on victim race when under cognitive
load than when not under a load. This study also examined whether participants were more likely
to endorse questions ascribing upward counterfactual thought when under cognitive load than
when not under cognitive load. Based on the Goldinger et al. (2003) research, the expectation
was that participants would have higher endorsement of the questions ascribing counterfactual
thought as well as be more likely to assign blame based on the race of the teen in the scenario,
with Black teens being assigned more blame than White or no race listed.

3.1

Methods
Participants
The participants included 146 Georgia State University undergraduate students. All the

students participated for course credit and self-reported their age (range = 18-50 years, with the
majority (92%) between 18-24), gender (72% female, 26% male, 1% non-binary) and race (39%
African American, 18% White/Caucasian, 20% Latino/a/x, 19% Asian, 5% Bi-Multi Racial, and
1% Other Races).
Materials
Counterfactual Thinking. Individual propensity for counterfactual thinking was measured
using the Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale (CTNES; Rye, Cahoon, Ali, and

Daftary, 2008) other-referent upward subscale. For this scale, participants are asked to recall a
recent negative event then respond to a series of questions [e.g., “If only another person (or other
people) had not been so selfish, this whole mess could have been avoided”] on a 1 to 5 Likert
scale (1 = Never, 5 = Very Often). Questions ascribing counterfactual thought specific to the
scenarios were also presented after each scenario (e.g., “If only the youth had behaved
differently, the outcome would not have happened”; “If only the situation had been different, the
outcome would not have happened”) to which participants responded on a 1 to 7 Likert scale (1=
Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree).
Cognitive Load. (Goldinger et al., 2003). For 8 of the 16 scenarios presented, participants
completed a randomly assigned cognitive load procedure. Following procedures used in
Goldinger, et at. (2003) and Kleider, Knuycky and Cavrak (2012), on load trials, participants
were presented with six non-words (e.g., lapek, willant, fegole, etc.) simultaneously for 30
seconds and then were required to hold the items in memory while they read the scenarios and
answer the questions. Participants thus read and rated the scenarios while keeping these nonwords in mind. After participants completed the questions, they were asked to type as many of
the non-words as possible. Accuracy of the typed words provided was assessed to ensure
participants were attempting to remember the non-words throughout the task. Participants had to
get above 80% of the non-words correct to be considered loaded.
Automated Operation Span (OSPAN; Unsworth et al., 2005). The automated operation
span task is a measure of working memory capacity in adults. Participants were first presented
with a simple math problem (e.g., (1*2) + 1 = ?) after which a numerical answer is presented
(e.g., 3). Participants verified the accuracy of the answer by responding “True” or “False”.
Following the math problem and solution, participants were presented with a letter that needed to

be recalled later. Participants were presented problem/letter sets ranging between three and
seven. Letters were presented to participants in a matrix that required participants to choose the
letters in the correct sequence shown. Participants received accuracy feedback after every trial. A
total score was calculated based on the number of letters correctly recalled on trials in which
participants were more than 85% accurate on the math problems. This numeric score was used as
a continuous variable in subsequent analyses.
Procedure
Participants were shown the same series of scenarios described above. Scenarios and
subsequent questions were not timed for participants. Cognitive load was manipulated within
subjects so that half of the scenarios were presented under cognitive load and half were not. Then
participants assigned blame and endorsement of counterfactual thinking questions. Finally,
participants were required to recall all previously seen non-words for that trial by typing them
into a blank text box.

3.2

Results
Participants used the full 1-7 Likert scale when responding to the questions about moral

blame, legal blame, and counterfactual thinking. There were a wide range of OSPAN scores (1374) with an average score of 54 and a right skew to those data (e.g., skewed towards higher
scores on the test). There was a strong correlation between moral and legal responsibility. The
counterfactual thinking questions were moderately correlated with both moral and legal
responsibility. The CTNES and the OSPAN were not correlated with any other variables. Full
descriptive statistics for Study 1 can be found in Tables 2 and 3.

To address possible confounding of the counterfactual thinking questions created for the
purpose of this study and the outcome variables of moral and legal blame, a confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) was conducted. This CFA measured if the moral blame, legal blame, and
counterfactual questions were all measuring one latent factor, which would indicate these
variables were all measuring the same construct. Analyses were conducted using Mplus version
8. This model had poor overall model fit indicated by a significant Chi-squared value (χ2(7) =
26514.32, p < 0.001), an RMSCA value over .10 (.98), and a CFI value of less than .90 (.10).
The suspected reason for this poor model fit is the weak factor loading of the counterfactual
thinking variables, which was .44. These results indicate that the moral blame, legal blame, and
counterfactual questions were not measuring the same underlying construct, and therefore not
confounded by measuring the same thing. Full table of CFA results can be found in Table 4.
A series of linear mixed effects models (LMM) were used to examine the relationship
among blame assigned, victim race, participant reliance on counterfactual thinking (measured
both as the general propensity to engage in CF and scenario specific question endorsement), and
participant WMC. LMM is a statistical model that describes the relationship between outcome
response variable and predictor variables that are a mix of fixed and random factors. LMM was
chosen over the classical repeated measures ANOVA and MANOVA for several reasons: the
data include multiple continuous predictor variables along with the categorical repeated
measured design; LMM allows for configurations of grouping hierarchies (as victim race and
load are nested within the scenario presented); the data include both fixed and random factors.
These data were analyzed using a series of Likelihood Ratio Tests. This analysis method
involves systematically comparing a full model (with all possible variables) to subsequent nested
models lacking the variables of interest to determine which of those are factors that contribute

significantly to the model. Data analysis was conducted in R (R Core Team, 2018) using lme4
(Bates, Maechler & Bolker, 2012) to perform a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship
among variables. As fixed effects, the scenario specific counterfactual questions, CFTNES,
OSPAN, cognitive load, and victim race were entered into the model. As random effects,
intercepts for subjects and scenarios were calculated. Visual inspection of residual plots did not
reveal any obvious deviations from homoscedasticity or normality. P-values were obtained by
likelihood ratio tests of the full model with the variables of interest against the model without.
The final model chosen to interpret had the lowest Akaike information criterion (AIC) value in
comparison to the other models.
At the time of analysis, there was no available options for a priori power analysis on
Linear Mixed Models. Post hoc Monte Carlo simulations were conducted to ensure that adequate
power had been achieved to detect a medium effect using the Simr R (R Core Team, 2018)
package (Green & MacLeod, 2016). The Simr package uses data already collected to simulate
how many participants are needed to detect an effect and outputs how many participants are
needed to reach each power level. The current full model reached power to detect a medium
effect at 125 participants.
Full Model
The full model tested included assigned moral and legal responsibility as outcome
variables, general propensity for counterfactual thinking (CFTNES), Counterfactual Questions,
OSPAN scores, victim race, and cognitive load as fixed factors, and the participant number and
scenario as random factors in order to specify a repeated measures design. This model was
systematically compared to all subsequent models to assess whether individual variables account
for variance in the outcome. The model was constructed as follows:

Blame ~ OSPAN + Load + Race + Counterfactual Questions + CTNES + (1|Subject)
Interaction Models
A model that included the interaction between cognitive load and the Race was
conducted. The model was constructed as follows:
Blame ~ OSPAN + Load *Race + Counterfactual Questions + CTNES + (1|Subject)
The interaction between load and race did not affect blame in the moral (χ2(1) = 0.61, p =
0.43) or legal (χ2(1) = 1.95, p = 0.16) models.
A model that included the interaction between cognitive load and the counterfactual
questions was conducted. The model was constructed as follows:
Blame ~ OSPAN + Race + Load*Counterfactual Questions + CTNES + (1|Subject)
The interaction between Load and the Counterfactual Questions did not affect blame in
the moral (χ2(3) = 0.58, p = 0.90) or legal (χ2(3) = 1.32, p = 0.72) models.
Cognitive Load Models
Three models with differing combinations of included cognitive load variables were
compared to the full model above. The first model included the OSPAN but not the load
manipulation. The models were constructed as follows:
Blame ~ OSPAN + Race + Counterfactual Questions + CTNES + (1|Subject)
The cognitive load manipulation did not affect blame in the moral (χ2(1) = 0.003, p =
0.99) or legal (χ2(1) = 0.004, p = 0.95) models.
The second model included the load manipulation but excluded OSPAN. This model was
constructed as follows:
Blame ~ Load + Race + Counterfactual Questions + CTNES + (1|Subject)

The inclusion of participant WMC did not affect blame in the moral (χ2(1) = 3.83, p =
0.05) or legal (χ2(1) = 2.92, p = 0.09) models.
The third cognitive load model included neither the OSPAN scores nor the cognitive load
manipulation. This model was constructed as follows:
Blame ~ Race + Counterfactual Questions + CTNES + (1|Subject)
The inclusion of participant WMC and the cognitive load manipulation did not affect
blame in the moral (χ2(2) = 3.83, p = 0.15) or legal (χ2(3) = 2.93, p = 0.23) models.

Counterfactual Thinking Models
Three models including counterfactual thinking variables were compared to the full
model above. The first model included the CTNES but not the scenario specific questions. The
model was constructed as follows:
Blame ~ OSPAN + Load + Race + CTNES + (1|Subject)
The inclusion of questions ascribing counterfactual thought affected blame in the moral
model (χ2(1) = 343.38, p < 0.001), increasing blame ratings by about 0.46 ± 0.002 (standard
errors) and legal model (χ2(1) = 251.29, p < 0.001), increasing blame ratings by about 0.40 ±
0.002 (standard errors).
The second model included the scenario specific questions but not the CTNES. The
model was constructed as follows:
Blame ~ OSPAN + Load + Race + Counterfactual Questions + (1|Subject)
The inclusion of the CTNES did not affect blame in the moral (χ2(1) = 2.11, p = 0.15) or
legal (χ2(1) = 1.21, p = 0.27) models.

The third model of CF included neither the CTNES nor the scenario specific questions.
The model was constructed as follows:
Blame ~ OSPAN + Load + Race + (1|Subject)
The inclusion of questions ascribing counterfactual thought and the CTNES affected
blame in the moral model, χ2(1) = 344.89, p < 0.001, lowering blame ratings by about 0.28 ±
0.06 (standard errors) and legal model, χ2(1) = 249.71, p < 0.001, lowering blame ratings by
about 0.28 ± 0.06 (standard errors).
Final Model
The final model chosen based on the model comparisons using the likelihood ratio test,
AIC, and parsimony was the model that removed cognitive load and WMC. Participant race was
controlled for by including as a predictor in this final model and had no effect on the outcome,
interactions, or predictor variables. For full comparison of all models see Table 2.
Blame ~ Race + Counterfactual Questions + CTNES + (1|Subject)
Endorsement of the counterfactual questions significantly predicted moral, b = 0.46,
t(145) = 19.32, p < .001, and legal, b = 0.40, t(145) = 16.36, p < .001, blame assigned. Inclusion
of race also significantly predicted blame when compared to the no race condition, but only
when the target race was “Black” in both moral, b = -0.44, t(145) = -5.42, p < .001, and legal, b =
-0.51, t(145) = 6.08, p < .001, blame assigned. Overall, the more a participant endorsed the
counterfactual statements, the more blame they in turn assigned to the victim in the scenario. The
Black victim in the scenario also received less blame than the other races, which is opposite the
hypothesized relationship between race and blame.
Follow-up Model

In order to better understand how race and cognitive load influence counterfactual
thinking, a follow-up model using counterfactual thinking as the outcome variable was
conducted. The result of that model was that counterfactual questions were endorsed less when
the victim in the scenario was White, b = -0.19, t(130) = -2.63, p < .01.

4

STUDY 2

As previously mentioned, Kubota and Ito (2014) find that the positive facial expression
may modulate the association between Black male faces and negative outcomes. The purpose of
this study was to examine counterfactual thinking and blame based on race when the context of
facial expression is considered. Based on previous research by Kubota and Ito (2014), it was
expected that participants would be less likely to assign blame or endorse questions ascribing
counterfactual thought when a positive rather than neutral face was presented.

4.1

Methods
Participants
The participants included 138 Georgia State University undergraduate students. All the

students participated for course credit and self-reported their age (range = 18-50 years, with the
majority (85%) between 18-24), gender (73% female, 24% male, 3% non-binary) and race (43%
African American, 18% White/Caucasian, 14% Latino/a/x, 8% Asian, 12% Bi-Multi Racial, and
5% Other Races).
Materials
Face Stimuli. 14 pre-rated images of faces of young Black, White and racially ambiguous
males with positive and neutral facial expressions as determined from the Pilot Study.
Procedure
Participants were shown the same series of scenarios described in Study 1. The only
change was that these scenarios do not specify the race of the teen in text. This study instead
included the addition of a face priming manipulation. Faces of African American, White, and
racially ambiguous teen males were shown to participants for 200ms before they read the

scenarios. Faces were randomly assigned scenarios and included blank screens. No link between
the face and the scenario was explicitly described to the participants, participants were just told
that they may see a face before reding a scenario. Of these faces half were positive (smiling) and
half were neutral (no expression).

4.2

Results
Participants used the full 1-7 Likert scale when responding to the questions about moral

blame, legal blame, and counterfactual thinking. There was a strong correlation between moral
and legal responsibility. The counterfactual thinking questions were moderately correlated with
both moral and legal responsibility. The CTNES was not correlated with any other variables. Full
descriptive statistics for Study 2 can be found in Tables 7 and 8.
Similar to Study 1, to address possible confounding of the counterfactual thinking
questions created for the purpose of this study and the outcome variables of moral and legal
blame, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted. This CFA measured if the moral
blame, legal blame, and counterfactual questions were all measuring one latent factor, which
would indicate these variables were all measuring the same construct. Analyses were conducted
using Mplus version 8. This model had poor overall model fit indicated by a significant Chisquared value (χ2(12) = 19290.84, p < 0.001), an RMSCA value over .10 (.98), and a CFI value
of less than .90 (.07). The suspected reason for this poor model fit is the weak factor loading of
the counterfactual thinking variables, which was .44. These results indicate that the moral blame,
legal blame, and counterfactual questions were not measuring the same underlying construct, and
therefore not confounded by measuring the same thing. Full table of CFA results can be found in
Table 9.

Similar to Study 1, data analysis was conducted in R (R Core Team, 2018) using lme4
(Bates, Maechler & Bolker, 2012) to perform a linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship
among variables. As fixed effects, the scenario specific counterfactual questions, CTNES, face
valence, and face race were entered into the model. As random effects, intercepts for subjects
and scenarios were calculated. Visual inspection of residual plots did not reveal any obvious
deviations from homoscedasticity or normality. P-values were obtained by likelihood ratio tests
of the full model with the variables of interest against the model without. Again, the final model
chosen to interpret had the lowest Akaike information criterion (AIC) value in comparison to the
other models.
Post hoc Monte Carlo simulations were conducted to ensure that adequate power had
been achieved to detect a medium effect using the Simr r package Green & MacLeod (2016).
Adequate power was achieved with the current sample size. The Simr package uses data already
collected to simulate how many participants are needed to detect an effect and outputs how many
participants are needed to reach each power level. The current full model reached power to detect
a medium effect at 121 participants.
Full Model
The full model tested included assigned moral and legal responsibility as outcome
variables, general propensity for counterfactual thinking (CFTNES), scenario specific
counterfactual questions, face valence, and face race as fixed factors, and the participant number
and scenario as random factors in order to specify a repeated measures design. The interaction
between cognitive load and victim race was included in this model. The model was constructed
as follows:
Blame ~ Face Valence + Face Race + Counterfactual Questions + CTNES + (1|Subject)

Interaction Models
A model that included the interaction between face valence and face race was conducted.
The model was constructed as follows:
Blame ~ Face Valence*Face Race + Counterfactual Questions + CTNES + (1|Subject)
The interaction between face valence and face race did affect blame in the moral model
such that neutral Black faces were assigned less blame (χ2(2) = 8.02, p < .05) but not in the legal
model (χ2(2) = 3.05, p = 0.22).
A model that included the interaction between face valence and counterfactual thinking
was conducted. The model was constructed as follows:
Blame ~ Face Valence*Counterfactual Questions + Face Race + CTNES + (1|Subject)
The interaction between face valence and counterfactual questions did not affect blame in
the moral model (χ2(2) = 3.11, p = 0.21) however, this interaction did affect blame in the legal
model such that when a face was Black, CF was endorsed less and blame was also assigned less
(χ2(2) = 8.034, p < .05).
A model that included the interaction between counterfactual thinking and face race was
conducted. The model was constructed as follows:
Blame ~ Face Valence + Face Race*Counterfactual Questions + CTNES + (1|Subject)
The interaction between counterfactual questions and face race did not affect blame in the
moral (χ2(1) = 1.14, p = 0.28) or legal (χ2(2) = 2.01, p = 0.17) models.
Face Models
Three models with differing combinations of included cognitive load variables were
compared to the full model above. The first face model included the race manipulation but
excluded valence. This model was constructed as follows:

Blame ~ Race + Counterfactual Questions + CTNES + (1|Subject)
The inclusion of the face valence did not affect blame in the moral (χ2(1) = 0.06, p =
0.81) or legal (χ2(1) = 0.13, p = 0.72) models.
The second included the valence manipulation but not the race manipulation. The models
were constructed as follows:
Blame ~ Valence + Counterfactual Questions + CTNES + (1|Subject)
The inclusion of face race affected blame in the moral model (χ2(2) = 56.85, p < 0.001),
lowering blame ratings by about 0.47 ± 0.09 (standard errors) and legal model (χ2(2) = 44.30, p <
0.001), with white faces increasing blame ratings by about 0.49 ± 0.08 (standard errors).
The third included neither the valance nor the race manipulation. This model was
constructed as follows:
Blame ~ Counterfactual Questions + CTNES + (1|Subject)
The inclusion of face valence and face race affected blame in the moral model (χ2(3) =
57.01, p < 0.001) and legal model (χ2(3) = 44.31, p < 0.001).
Counterfactual Thinking Models
Three models with differing combinations of included counterfactual thinking propensity
variables were compared to the full model above. The first model included the CTNES but not
the scenario specific questions. The model was constructed as follows:
Blame ~ Valence + Race + Counterfactual Questions + (1|Subject)
The inclusion of the CTNES did not affect blame in the moral (χ2(1) = 0.07, p = 0.79) or
legal (χ2(1) = 0.72, p = 0.40) models.
The second model included the scenario specific questions but not the CTNES. The
model was constructed as follows:

Blame ~ Valence + Race + CTNES + (1|Subject)
The inclusion of the counterfactual questions affected blame in the moral model (χ2(1) =
184.64, p < 0.001), increasing blame ratings by about 0.50 ± 0.04 (standard errors) and legal
model (χ2(1) = 198.33, p < 0.001), lowering blame ratings by about 0.05 ± 0.03 (standard errors).
The third model of CF included neither the CTNES nor the scenario specific questions.
The model was constructed as follows:
Blame ~ Valence + Race + (1|Subject)
The inclusion of questions ascribing counterfactual thought and the CTNES affected
blame in the moral model (χ2(3) = 57.01, p < 0.001) and legal model (χ2(3) = 44.31, p < 0.001).
Final Model
The final model chosen based on the model comparisons using the likelihood ratio test,
AIC, and parsimony for the moral model was that which included interaction between race and
valence without the CTNES. Participant race was controlled for in this final model as well and
had no effect on the outcome, interactions, or predictor variables. For full comparison see Table
4.
Moral Blame ~ Valence*Race + Counterfactual Questions + (1|Subject)
Endorsement of the counterfactual questions significantly predicted moral (b = 0.50,
t(130) = 6.22, p < .001) blame assigned. Inclusion of race also significantly predicted blame
when compared to the ambiguous condition, but only when the target race was “white” in the
moral blame assigned (b = 0.54, t(130) = 4.47, p < .001). There was a significant interaction
between valence and race such that Black neutral faces received less blame (b = -0.51, t(130) = 2.82, p < .01). Overall, the more a participant endorsed the counterfactual statements, the more
blame they in turn assigned to the victim in the scenario. The Black neutral faces also received

less blame than the happy or other race faces. This finding was opposite of the hypothesized
relationship.
The final model for the legal blame was that which included the interaction between race
and the counterfactual thinking questions without the CTNES. Participant race was controlled for
in this final model as well and had no effect on the outcome, interactions, or predictor variables.
Legal Blame ~ Valence + Race*Counterfactual Questions + (1|Subject)
Endorsement of the counterfactual questions significantly predicted moral (b = 0.50,
t(130) = 6.22, p < .001) blame assigned. There was a significant interaction between valence and
race such that counterfactual questions were endorsed less for Black faces, which in turn
received less blame (b = -0.51, t(130) = -2.82, p < .01). Overall, the more a participant endorsed
the counterfactual statements, the more blame they in turn assigned to the victim in the scenario.
This was not the case for Black faces, which received less endorsement of counterfactual
questions and less legal blame. This relationship between race, counterfactual thinking, and
blame was opposite of the hypothesized relationship among these variables.
Follow-up Model
In order to better understand how face valence influence counterfactual thinking, a
follow-up model using counterfactual thinking as the outcome variable was conducted. The
result of that model was that counterfactual questions were endorsed less when the victim in the
scenario was White (b = -0.13, t(130) = -2.36, p < .05).

5

DISCUSSION

According to the CDC, the leading cause of death for African American males between
ages 1 – 19 is homicide, which accounted for 35.3% of deaths at the current listing (CDC, 2018).
For comparison, for White males of the same age range homicide only accounts for 5.2% of
deaths (CDC, 2018). Additionally, Edwards, Lee, and Esposito (2019) found that African
American males are 2.5 times more likely than their white counterparts to be killed by police
officers. These findings highlight the stark racial disparities in youth mortality that continue to
exist in the United States. We know from previous research that people can rely on heuristic
processing in situations where race is a salient factor and thus leading to decision-making tainted
by racial biases (Correll et al., 2002; Blair et al., 2004; Kleider et al., 2012; Goldinger et al.,
2003; Jones & Kaplan, 2003).
In the current studies, factors that influence blame assignment based on race were
investigated in crime scenarios. Specifically, how does the propensity for counterfactual thought,
cognitive capacity, and face valence play into decision-making when race is a salient factor? Do
people who engage in counterfactual thinking rely more heavily on stereotypes? What about
those with limited cognitive capacity? Can these negative decision-making strategies be
modulated by the emotional valence projected from the perceived victim? The overarching goal
of the studies was to test the relationship between the reliance on counterfactual thinking and the
reliance on racial stereotypes as well as what factors exacerbate and modulate these responses.
Study 1
In Study 1 it was hypothesized that victim race, propensity for counterfactual thinking,
and cognitive capacity (and subsequent load manipulations) would predict the blame assigned to
the victim in the scenario. A person’s propensity to engage in upward counterfactual thinking

would be related to their propensity to make judgments based on the race of the victim. These
factors were also thought to be influenced by the participant’s available cognitive resources and
working memory capacity. Consistent with previous research on counterfactual thinking and
cognitive capacity, this hypothesis was that these variables would have a positive predictive
relationship with the blame assigned to the victim in the scenario. The statistically significant
differences among the counterfactual measures indicate that those variables are explaining a
significant amount of variance in responsibility assigned. Specifically, as propensity to endorse
counterfactual thinking increased blame assigned also increased. This finding is consistent with
previous literature that indicates a positive relationship between counterfactual thinking and
blame assigned to the victim (Goldinger et al., 2003). This finding along with the previous
literature suggests that the more likely a person is to engage in “what-if” thinking to picture
alternatives to a current negative situation, the more likely they are to blame the victim in the
situation (e.g., if only the person had behaved differently, the outcome would have been better).
However, the current study diverges from that of Goldinger et al. (2003) in terms of cognitive
load and working memory capacity. The differences between the full model and the cognitive
load models can be interpreted as the cognitive load and WMC variables do not explain a
significant amount of variance in the responsibility assigned. One possible reason for this
difference could be the generally high OSPAN scores in the current sample. It is possible that the
current participants were able to successfully hold the cognitive load manipulation in mind while
continuing to monitor their responses to the questions. Therefore, in this sample, this load
manipulation may not have been a difficult enough task to successfully load the participants
WMC.

Including race in the model also significantly predicted the blame assigned to the
individual in the scenario. However, this effect was in the opposite of the predicted direction.
Assigning the race of “Black” to the person in the scenario decreased the amount of blame
assigned. A further follow up analysis found that participants were less likely to endorse
questions ascribing counterfactual thought when the assigned race in the scenario was “White.”
Though this finding is opposed to the current literature on the BMC, other research has found
that, when race is a salient factor, juror decision making bias is lessened (Sommers & Ellsworth,
2000, 2001). Race of the teen in the scenario was manipulated in the current study, however
there was no deception in an attempt to make it a less salient factor. It is possible that the race of
the youth in the scenario was salient to the participants in this study, therefore modulating their
racial biases. This theory of race salience could also explain why counterfactual thought was
ascribed differently based on race. Roese et al. (2005) suggest that when counterfactual thinking
is deliberate, it is often related to ongoing goal. If, in this case, race was salient and the
participants had an ongoing goal to monitor the race of the person in the scenario, this could
explain the endorsement of counterfactual thinking.
Study 2
In Study 2 it was hypothesized that face race, valence, and propensity for counterfactual
thinking (both generally and task specific) would impact the blame assigned to the victim in the
scenario. Again, engagement in counterfactual thinking would be related to the propensity to
make judgments based on the race of the victim. These factors were also thought to be
modulated by the facial expression presented on the prime. Consistent with previous research on
counterfactual thinking, race, and facial emotion, this hypothesis was that these variables would
have a positive predictive relationship with the blame assigned to the victim in the scenario with

the exception of valence. The statistically significant differences among the counterfactual
measures indicate that as propensity to endorse counterfactual thinking blame assigned also
increased. This finding is again consistent with previous literature on counterfactual thinking and
blame assigned (Goldinger et al., 2003). In this study, including race in the model also
significantly predicted the blame assigned to the individual in the scenario. However, this effect
was in the opposite of the predicted direction. As in Study 1, a further follow-up analysis
revealed that participants were less likely to endorse questions ascribing counterfactual thought
when the assigned race in the scenario was “White.” Therefore, results of both are discussed
below. The interaction between valence (facial expression) and race in the best fitting moral
model indicated that Black neutral faces received less blame. This finding is not consistent with
previous literature on BMC stereotype, which would suggest that Black males would receive
more blame. Nor was this finding consistent with the literature on face valence, which would
suggest that the happy faces would receive less blame than the neutral faces. The inconsistent
result of the face valence could be related to another more recent body of literature on remorse.
Funk, Walker, and Todorov (2017) found that faces that were perceived to be remorseful were
given less harsh sentences for crimes. These authors proposed that when a person shows
remorse, they acknowledge and accept responsibility for a wrongdoing. Faces that are perceived
to be remorseful often have a facial expression of raised inner eyebrows, downturned corners of
the mouth, and raised cheeks (Funk et al., 2017). Funk and collogues (2017) also note that
remorse is a part of a group of “unhappiness” emotional expressions which also include things
like sadness, shame and guilt. This group of facial features are opposite to the happy face stimuli
used in Study 2. The original theory was that seeing a face that is typically associated with
negative stereotypes in a positive light may reduce some of the blame assigned. It seems to have

had the opposite effect which could be explained by this tendency to assign less punishment to
faces that seem remorseful. It is possible that the comparison faces in Study 2 had more similar
facial expressions to that of remorseful faces, therefore those faces were assigned less blame.
A related theory that could describe the unexpected results of the race manipulation in
Study 2 is stereotype suppression, or an effort to resist making stereotypical judgment’s in order
to appear favorable (Plant & Devine, 1998). Galinsky and Moskowitz (2007) found that
stereotype suppression is a controlled decision-making process. However, this would not explain
the similar findings from Study 1, in which Black teens in the scenario were assigned less blame
under memory load. The individuals under memory load would have limited cognitive resources
to suppress active stereotypes, however the pattern of blame assignment based on race remained
the same. This finding suggests that the pattern of blame assignment may be related to the
sample or some sort of cultural shift instead of an attempt by participants to appear more
favorable.
Counterfactual Thinking and the Black Criminal Stereotype
Together, these studies suggest a consistency across multiple manipulations for the
relationship between counterfactual thinking, BMC, and blame. The lack of an interaction
between counterfactual thinking and cognitive load in Study 1 would suggest that, even when
burdened with information, participants are still more likely to assign blame when they endorse
counterfactual thoughts. This overall relationship among counterfactual thinking and blame
remains consistent across Study 1 and Study 2 in regard to both the moral and legal blame.
However, race does influence how much CF is endorsed when it is included as the outcome
variable in a model. In Study 2 there was an interaction between counterfactual thinking and race
in which Black victims were assigned less blame. Follow-up analyses for both Study 1 and Study

2 revealed that participants were less likely to endorse counterfactual thinking when the victim in
the scenario was White compared to Black or unidentified/ambiguous.
This finding is interesting with consideration to the Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) idea
of the simulation heuristic. If people do in fact determine the likelihood of an event based on
how easy the event is to picture in mind, why were our participants less likely to endorse
counterfactual thinking when the victim was White? This finding suggests that the current
participants may have found it more difficult to picture a White teen committing the act in the
scenario. This makes sense when considered as an alternative to the associations between Black
men and criminality found in previous literature (Correll et al., 2002; Blair et al., 2004; Kleider
et al., 2012). This research would suggest that it would be significantly easier to picture Black
males committing the crimes in the scenarios. By including White males in this scenario, the
expectation of the BMC stereotype may have been violated, therefore making it more difficult to
imagine White rather than Black males in the scenario.
Another possible theory that could explain the unexpected findings regarding victim race could
be attributed to the population used in this study. In past research, the current research population
has produced results that were not in line with the previous literature in studies regarding
manipulations of race. Specifically, Kleider and colleagues (2012) found that, when using this
research population, participants more harshly penalized White defendants in jury decision
making scenarios. The current research follows this pattern, therefore the results regarding the
race of the youth in the scenario could be the result of the response pattern of the current
population of racially diverse undergraduate students from a large university in the Southeastern
United States.
Moral versus Legal Blame

The results of these two studies together suggest that in the context of decision making
for crime scenarios, moral and legal blame may not always be assigned in a similar pattern. The
similarities in the best fitting models for moral and legal blame in Study 1 would suggest that the
two constructs were viewed similarly by participants. Regardless of cognitive load and
manipulation of race, participants assigned moral and legal blame in similar patterns. This
finding is consistent with that of Wikström and Treiber (2007) who found that people often
equate moral and legal judgments on behaviors. However, the differences in model fit in Study 2
suggests that, in certain contexts, these two constructs diverge. Moral blame was significantly
influenced by an interaction between race and valence while legal blame was influenced by the
interaction of race and counterfactual thinking. In both interactions, Black victims were assigned
less blame. The neutral face valence receiving less moral blame could again be related to the
remorse literature referenced previously (Funk et al., 2017). It follows that if a face was
perceived to be remorseful, or accepting responsibility for a wrongdoing, that people may then
find that person less morally in the wrong.
Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale (CTNES)
The CTNES was not a significant predictor of blame in any model in either study. This
finding could be the result of the incongruence between the scale itself and the current task. The
CTNES asks participants to imagine a negative event that happened to them and then asks
questions about that event related to endorsement of counterfactual thoughts. Of the four
subscales included in this measure, only one is other referent and therefore related to the present
studies. A reason for the lack of relationship between the CTNES and the blame outcome is that
the CTNES may be too specifically focused on self-referent counterfactual thinking and not
related enough to other-referent counterfactual thinking. It is possible that participants had

different counterfactual thought patterns for scenarios related to themselves than for scenarios
related to other people.
Limitations and Future Directions
The most notable limitation of this study was the age range of the participants. The
current sample was taken from a college freshman sample with the majority being between the
ages of 18 and 21 years. Though several of the studies cited here were conducted on a similar
population, variations in response based on participant race cannot be ruled out by this research.
Another limitation was the cross-sectional design of the study did not allow for mediation
analyses. Future directions for this research should include conducting a longitudinal study to
determine whether a mediation relationship exists among race, counterfactual thinking and
blame. This analysis could inform if counterfactual thinking mediates the relationship between
race and blame in crime scenarios. As the current study is cross-sectional, an analysis examining
counterfactual thinking as a mediating variable between race and blame assigned could not be
conducted. Cross-sectional mediation analyses often misrepresent the mediational relationship,
as a mediational relationship is defined as a relationship over time (O’Laughlin, Martin, &
Ferrer, 2018). Even though this analysis was not able to be conducted in good faith at the
present time, a future longitudinal study could help to clarify the nature of the relationship
among race and blame if counterfactual thinking does indeed mediate that relationship.
Another possible limitation was the context in which counterfactual thinking was
measures. The current studies only examined upward, other-referent, counterfactual thinking in
reference to blame assignment. Upward counterfactual thinking, or imaging how an event could
have turned out better, is associated with generally negative thoughts about the current situation
presented (Roese & Olson, 1995). It is possible that other kinds of counterfactual thinking (e.g.,

downward or non-referent counterfactual thinking) could have a different relationship with
blame assignment. Future research could examine this relationship by measuring different kinds
of counterfactual thinking patters when assigning blame in crime scenarios.
Another future direction would be to have the same group of faces used in Study 2 rated
for remorsefulness. As the research by Funk and colleagues (2017) suggests, remorseful faces
are assigned lesser punishments based on their association with “acceptance of responsibility.”
The neutral faces presented in Study 2 may be a closer match to these remorseful faces. This
study could clear up the ambiguity around the current results suggesting that happy faces
received more blame than neutral faces.
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Figure 1: Scenarios
Scenario 1:
On the evening of August 12th, a male teen
was seen walking through a neighborhood
by a neighborhood watch citizen around
11:45pm. The neighborhood watch patrol
became suspicious because the teen looked
to be about 16, it was late at night, and the
neighborhood was a gated, private property.
The patrol approached the teen to question
him. The teen told the patrol to leave him
alone and mind his own business. The patrol
responded by yelling back as the teen,
questioning his reasoning for being in the
neighborhood. The teen quickly turned and
began walking toward the patrol. The patrol
drew his weapon and demanded the teen stop
walking and raise his hands. The teen did not
raise his hands and the patrol officer fired his
weapon, injuring the teen.

Scenario 2:
On the night of June 8th around 9:45pm, a
male teen was seen by a gas station
employee loitering behind the station near
the dumpsters. The employee notified the
security guard that the teen seemed
suspicious. When approached, the teen was
on the phone arguing with someone. When
the security guard attempted to question the
teen, he ignored him. When the security
guard raised his voice to get the teen’s
attention, the teen began walking towards
the security guard, but continued talking on
the phone. The security guard drew his
weapon and demanded the teen stop walking
and raise his hands. The teen stopped, took
his phone away from his ear and moved his
hand towards his pocket. The security guard
fired his weapon, injuring the teen.

Scenario 3
On the evening of September 28th, a male
teen was seen walking through a
neighborhood by a neighborhood watch
citizen around 10:15pm. The neighborhood
watch patrol became suspicious because the
teen looked to be about 16, it was late at
night, and the neighborhood was a gated,
private property. The patrol approached the
teen to question him. The teen yelled at the
patrol to leave him alone and mind his own
business. The patrol responded by yelling
back as the teen, questioning his reasoning
for being in the neighborhood. The teen
quickly turned and began walking toward the
patrol. The patrol drew his weapon and
demanded the teen stop walking and raise his
hands. The teen refused to raise his hands
and the patrol officer fired his weapon,
injuring the teen.
Scenario 5

Scenario 4
On the evening of August 27th, a male teen
was reported by a store clerk for potential
shoplifting at 8:30pm. The store was located
in a busy suburban area. The teen was
described as wearing a hoodie and carrying a
backpack. A teen matching that description
was seen walking towards the door of the
store by a security guard. The security guard
yelled at the teen to stop, but the teen
continued walking. The security guard
attempted to take the backpack from the teen
but the teen quickly snatched the bag back.
The security guard noticed something
metallic on the teen’s belt and drew his
weapon. The teen moved quickly to set his
feet, and the guard fired his weapon, injuring
the teen.
Scenario 6

On the evening of July 20th, a male teen was
seen loitering behind a grocery store located
off of a busy street by a security guard at
10:30pm. The security guard was stationed
at the store as there was recent gang activity
reported in the area. The security guard
approached the teen and noticed that he
appeared to be spray-painting the backside
of the building, as there was possibly new
graffiti. The security guard yelled at the teen
to stop what he was doing and lie on the
ground, but the teen did not comply. The
security guard then drew his weapon and
demanded the teen raise his hands. The
security guard noticed something metallic in
the teen’s hand and fired his weapon,
injuring the teen.

On the evening of October 21st, a teen was
seen walking through a parking lot of a local
high school by a neighborhood watch
officer. There had been a recent string of
cars being broken in to. The teen appeared to
be stumbling and slurring his words while
talking on the phone loudly. The teen
stopped next to a luxury vehicle in the
parking lot and leaned on it. A neighborhood
watch officer asked the teen if that was his
car but the teen ignored him. The
neighborhood watch officer noticed
something metallic in the teen’s pocket and
drew his weapon. The neighborhood watch
officer told the teen to lie on the ground but
the teen did not comply. The teen then
stumbled forward towards the neighborhood
watch officer. The neighborhood watch
officer fired his weapon, injuring the teen.
Scenario 7
Scenario 8
On the afternoon of July 21st, a teen was
On the evening of August 27th, a male teen
seen walking through a local park by a
was reported by a store clerk for potential
neighborhood watch officer. The teen
shoplifting at 8:30pm. The teen was
approached a bike rack and began to struggle described as wearing a hoodie and carrying a
with one of the bike locks. The
backpack. A teen matching that description
neighborhood watch officer approached the
was seen walking towards the door of the
teen and asked what he was doing. The teen store by a security guard. The security guard
yelled at the officer to leave him alone and
yelled at the teen to stop, but the teen began
that the bike was his. The teen stood up and
walking faster. The security guard attempted
began to walk toward the officer. The
to take the backpack from the teen but the
neighborhood watch officer drew a weapon
teen quickly snatched the bag back, saying it
and told the teen to stop walking. The teen
was his. The security guard noticed
did not stop walking and the neighborhood
something metallic on the teen’s belt and
watch officer fired his weapon, injuring the
drew his weapon. The teen moved quickly,
teen.
and the guard fired his weapon, injuring the
teen.
Scenario 9
Scenario 10
On the afternoon of July 21st, a male teen
On the night of February 4th around
was seen walking through a local park by a
10:30pm, a teenage male was reported
neighborhood watch officer. The teen
loitering around an apartment building
approached a bike rack and began to struggle where there has been a series of recent
with one of the bike locks. The
break-ins. The building security guard office
neighborhood watch officer approached the
was notified. The teen was initially agitated
teen and asked what he was doing. The teen when approached by a security guard and
yelled at the officer to leave him alone and
questioned. While being questioned the teen
that the bike was his. The teen stood up and
had his hands in his pockets. When asked to

began to walk toward the officer. The
neighborhood watch officer drew a weapon
and told the teen to stop walking. The teen
did not stop walking and the neighborhood
watch officer fired his weapon, injuring the
teen.
Scenario11
On the evening of April 17th, a MARTA
security guard reported that a teen had
attempted to steal a woman’s purse on the
blue line. The teen was described as wearing
a white t-shirt and an Atlanta braves baseball
cap. The security guard saw a teen matching
that description in one of the terminals and
approached him. The teen refused to speak
to the security guard when he questioned his
previous whereabouts. The security guard
told the teen to remain there while he called
the police. The teen quickly got up and
began walking towards the security guard.
The security guard drew his weapon and told
the teen to sit back down. The security guard
noticed something metallic in the teen’s
hand and fired his weapon, injuring the teen.
Scenario 13
On the night of June 8th around 9:45pm,
a male teen was seen by a fast food
employee loitering behind their store. The
employee notified the security guard that
they felt something was off. When
approached, the teen began walking quickly
away form the back of the store. When the
security guard attempted to question the
teen, he ignored him. When the security
guard raised his voice to get the teen’s
attention, the teen stopped but still did not
answer. The security guard drew his weapon,
demanded the teen stop raise his hands. The
teen began walking toward the guard took
his phone away from his ear and moved his
hand towards his pocket. The security guard
fired his weapon, injuring the teen.
Scenario 15

remove them, the teen refused and began
yelling at the guard. The security guard then
drew his weapon and demanded the teen
raise his hands. When the teen removed his
hands from his pockets the security guard
saw something metallic in his hand and fired
his weapon, injuring the teen.
Scenario 12
On the night of April 23rd around 11:30pm,
a teenage male was reported casing cars in a
parking lot, which has had break-ins in the
past. The parking security guard office was
notified. The guard made his way to that
area of the parking lot. The security guard
approached a teen matching that description
in the parking lot. The teen was calm at first
but because agitated when asked why he was
there. When asked to sit still, the teen
refused and began yelling at the guard. The
security guard then drew his weapon and
demanded the teen raise his hands. When the
teen removed his hands from his pockets the
security guard saw something metallic in his
hand and fired his weapon, injuring the teen.
Scenario 14
On the evening of March 31st, a male teen
was reported as a runaway by his parents.
The teen was reported to be wearing a dark
jacket and a baseball cap. A neighborhood
watch officer saw a teen that matched that
description walking down the side of a road
at the front of the neighborhood. The officer
approached the teen and asked him his
name. The teen responded by telling the
neighborhood watch officer to leave him
alone. When the officer did not stop
following the teen, the teen began yelling at
the officer to get back and leave him alone.
The officer drew his weapon and told the
teen to raise his hands. The teen did not raise
his hands and began walking towards the
guard. The patrol officer fired his weapon,
injuring the teen.
Scenario 16

On the night of June 12th, a security guard
reported a male teen loitering in a park hours
after the park had closed. The security guard
approached the teen and asked him why he
was still in the park after hours. The teen
told the security guard that he was leaving
and began to walk away in another direction.
The security guard stopped the teen and told
him to leave the park. The teen put his hands
in his pockets and moved towards the guard.
The security guard drew his weapon and told
the teen to put his hands up. The teen
quickly removed his hand from his pocket
and the guard saw something metallic in his
had. The security guard fired his weapon
injuring the teen.

On the night of June 12th, a security guard
reported a male teen loitering in a park hours
after the park had closed. The security guard
approached the teen and asked him why he
was still in the park after hours. The teen
told the security guard that he was leaving
and began to walk away in another direction.
The security guard stopped the teen and told
him to leave the park. The teen put his hands
in his pockets and moved towards the guard.
The security guard drew his weapon and told
the teen to put his hands up. The teen
quickly removed his hand from his pocket
and the guard saw something metallic in his
had. The security guard fired his weapon
injuring the teen.

Table 1: Overall Face Ratings for the Original 45 Faces
Descriptive Statistics for Overall Faces Rated (n = 20)
n
Minimum
Maximum
Ambiguous
20
2.70
4.81
Black
20
1.55
4.93
White
20
1.53
4.97
Angry
20
1.22
3.31
Happy
20
1.64
6.32
Neutral
20
1.73
5.57
Teenager
20
4.86
6.19
Note: Mean scores reported based on agreement on a 1-7 Likert scale.

Mean
3.49
3.59
2.54
1.93
3.99
3.91
5.63

SD
0.59
1.22
1.22
0.53
1.79
1.27
0.33

Figure 2: Images with Mean Ratings
Neutral

Happy

Black: 4.64
Neutral: 5.20

Black: 4.89
Happy: 6.30

Black: 4.77
Neutral: 5.26

Black: 4.72
Happy: 5.96

White: 4.57
Neutral: 5.30

White: 4.76
Happy: 5.82

Black

Black

White

White

White: 4.58
Neutral: 5.55

White: 4.64
Happy: 6.30

Racially Ambiguous: 4.81
Neutral: 5.55

Racially Ambiguous: 4.32
Happy: 6.26

Racially Ambiguous: 4.26
Neutral: 5.55

Racially Ambiguous: 4.65
Happy: 6.12

Racially
Ambiguous

Racially
Ambiguous

Racially
Ambiguous

Racially Ambiguous: 4.55
Neutral: 5.57

Racially Ambiguous: 4.69
Happy: 5.68

Table 2: Study 1 Descriptive Information
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 Variables (n = 146)
1
2
3
4
1. Moral Responsibility
2. Legal Responsibility
.80
3. Counterfactual Thinking
.42
.37
4. CTNESa
.09
.08
.05
b
5. OSPAN
.12
.11
.07
.12
Min
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Max
7.00
7.00
7.00
5.00
Mean
3.62
3.46
4.27
3.27
SD
1.86
1.90
1.56
0.97
Note: aCounterfactual thinking for negative events scale. bOperation span

5

13.00
74.00
56.62
11.94

Table 3: Means by Categorical Variables for Study 1
Mean Ratings by Categorical Variables for Study 1 (n = 146)
Scenario Race
Load
Moral Blame
Legal Blame
Load
3.76
3.38
Black
No Load
3.31
3.12
Load
3.49
3.27
White
No Load
3.70
3.48
None
No Load
3.79
3.64

CF
4.48
4.30
3.87
4.16
4.32

Note: aCounterfactual thinking. Mean scores reported based on agreement on a 1-7 Likert scale.

Table 4: CFA Table Study 1
Parameter Estimates for Study 1 CFA
Relation/Variable
Factor Loadings
Blame by Moral Blame
Blame by Legal Blame
Blame by Counterfactual Thinking
Means/Intercepts
Moral Blame
Legal Blame
Counterfactual Thinking
Observed/Error Variances
Moral Blame
Legal Blame
Counterfactual Thinking
Factor Variance
Blame (factor)

Estimate

SE

Ratio

p

Std

1.00
0.91
0.39

—a
0.03
0.02

—
30.12
19.94

—
<0.01
<0.01

0.95
0.85
0.44

3.63
3.46
4.27

0.04 94.38
0.04 87.78
0.03 132.17

<0.01
<0.01
<0.01

1.95
1.82
2.74

0.34
1.03
1.96

0.09
0.08
0.06

3.57
12.32
33.15

<0.01
<0.01
<0.01

0.10
0.28
0.80

3.12

0.14

22.67

<0.01

1.00

Table 5: Study 1 Model Comparison
Study 1 Linear Mixed Effects Model Comparisons (n = 146)
Moral
Moral X2
Model
Equation
AIC
Full
Blame ~ OSPAN + Load +
Race + Counterfactual
Full
8522.4
Questions + CTNES +
(1|Subject)
Blame ~ OSPAN + Load
Interaction
*Race + Counterfactual
8524.1
p = 0.61
Load/Race
Questions + CTNES +
(1|Subject)
Blame ~ OSPAN + Load +
Interaction
Race*Counterfactual
8527.8
p = 0.90
Race/CF
Questions + CTNES +
(1|Subject)
Blame ~ WMC + Race +
Load
Counterfactual Questions + 8522.4
p = 0.74
CTNES + (1|Subject)
Blame ~ Load + Race +
WMC
Counterfactual Questions + 8522.4
p = 0.05
CTNES + (1|Subject)
Blame ~ Race +
WMC/Load Counterfactual Questions + 8522.5
p = 0.15
CTNES + (1|Subject)
Blame ~ OSPAN + Load +
CF
8863.9 p < 0.001***
Race + (1|Subject)
Blame ~ OSPAN + Load +
CNTES
Race + Counterfactual
8522.6
p = 0.15
Questions + (1|Subject)
Blame ~ OSPAN + Load +
CF/CNTES
Race + CTNES +
8864.3 p < 0.001***
(1|Subject)
Blame ~ OSPAN + Load +
Race
Counterfactual Questions + 8886.9 p < 0.001***
CTNES + (1|Subject)

Legal
AIC

Legal X2 Full

8662.6

-

8662.6

p = 0.16

8667.2

p = 0.72

8661.6

p = 0.95

8663.5

p = 0.09

8661.5

p = 0.23

8911.8

p < 0.001***

8661.8

p = 0.27

8911.4

p < 0.001***

8945.5

p < 0.001***

Table 6: Study 1 Final Model
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Blame (N = 146)
Moral Blame
Variable

B

(Intercept)

1.34

Counterfactual

SE B

Legal Blame
β

B

SE B

β

0.31

4.42***

1.52

0.33

4.62***

0.46

0.02

19.32***

0.40

0.02

16.36***

CTNES

0.14

0.08

1.68___

0.12

0.09

1.30___

Race: Black

-0.44

0.08

-5.42***

-0.51

0.08

6.08***

Race: White

-0.02

0.08

-0.22___

-0.10

0.08

-1.24___

Note: CTNES = Counterfactual thinking for negative events scale
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Table 7: Study 2 Model Comparison
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 Variables (n = 138)
1
2
3
4
1. Moral Responsibility
2. Legal Responsibility
.69
3. Counterfactual Thinking
.37
.37
a
5. CTNES
.05
.02
.17
Min
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Max
7.00
7.00
7.00
5.00
Mean
3.42
3.21
4.18
3.12
SD
1.96
1.93
1.40
1.09
Note: aCounterfactual thinking for negative events scale.

Table 8: Means by Categorical Variables for Study 2
Mean Ratings by Categorical Variables for Study 2 (n = 138)
Face Race
Face Valence Moral Blame Legal Blame
Happy
3.29
3.14
Black
Neutral
2.97
2.94
Happy
3.72
3.55
White
Neutral
3.82
3.50
Happy
3.24
3.03
Ambiguous
Neutral
3.54
3.22

CFa
4.26
4.16
4.06
4.13
4.18
4.31

Note: aCounterfactual thinking. Mean scores based on agreement on a 1-7 Likert scale.

Table 9: CFA Table Study 2
Parameter Estimates for Study 2 CFA
Relation/Variable
Factor Loadings
Blame by Moral Blame
Blame by Legal Blame
Blame by Counterfactual Thinking
Means/Intercepts
Moral Blame
Legal Blame
Counterfactual Thinking
Observed/Error Variances
Moral Blame
Legal Blame
Counterfactual Thinking
Factor Variance
Blame (factor)

Estimate

SE

Ratio

p

Std

1.00
0.99
0.38

—a
0.05
0.02

—
19.11
15.99

—
<0.01
<0.01

0.83
0.83
0.44

3.42
3.21
4.18

0.05 71.64
0.05 68.43
0.03 122.94

<0.01
<0.01
<0.01

2.15
2.43
1.59

1.20
1.16
1.57

0.13
0.13
0.06

8.99
8.95
27.5

<0.01
<0.01
<0.01

0.31
0.31
0.80

2.64

0.18

14.77

<0.01

1.00

Table 10: Study 2 Model Comparison
Study 2 Linear Mixed Effects Model Comparisons (n = 138)
Model
Equation
Moral
Moral X2
AIC
Full
Blame ~ Valence + Race
+ Counterfactual
Full
6450.2
Questions + CTNES +
(1|Subject)
Blame ~ Valence*Race +
Interaction
Counterfactual Questions
6446.2
p < 0.05*
Valence/Race
+ CTNES + (1|Subject)
Interaction
Blame ~ Valence*Race +
Valence/Race Counterfactual Questions
6444.2
p < 0.01**
no CTNES
+ (1|Subject)
Blame ~ Valence +
Interaction
Race*Counterfactual
6451.1
p = 0.21
CF/Race
Questions + CTNES +
(1|Subject)
Interaction
Blame ~ Valence +
CF/Race no
Race*Counterfactual
6449.1
p = 0.08
CTNES
Questions + (1|Subject)
Blame ~ Race +
Interaction
Valence*Counterfactual
6451.0
p = 0.28
Valence/CF
Questions + CTNES +
(1|Subject)
Blame ~ Valence + Race
CF
6632.8 p < 0.001***
+ (1|Subject)
Blame ~ Valence + Race
CTNES
6448.2
p = 0.78
+ CTNES + (1|Subject)
Blame ~ Valence + Race
CF Questions
+ Counterfactual
6501.2 p < 0.001***
Questions + (1|Subject)
Blame ~ Race +
Valence
Counterfactual Questions
6448.2
p = 0.81
+ CTNES + (1|Subject)
Blame ~ Valence +
Race
Counterfactual Questions
6503.0 p < 0.001***
+ CTNES + (1|Subject)
Blame ~ Counterfactual
Valence/Race
Questions + CTNES +
6501.2 p < 0.001***
(1|Subject)

Legal
AIC

Legal X2 Full

6330.8

-

6331.7

p = 0.22

6330.5

p = 0.13

6326.8

p < 0.05*

6325.5

p < 0.01**

6330.8

p = 0.16

6527.1

p < 0.001***

6329.5

p = 0.50

6369.1

p < 0.001***

6328.9

p = 0.72

6371.1

p < 0.001***

6269.1

p < 0.001***

Table 11: Study 2 Final Moral Model
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables
Predicting Moral Blame (N = 138)
Moral Blame
Variable

B

SE B

β

(Intercept)

1.17

0.10

6.22***

Valence: Neutral

0.23

0.12

1.19___

Race: Black

0.006

0.10

0.05___

Race: White

0.54

0.12

4.47***

Counterfactual

0.50

0.03

13.93***

Neutral: Black

-0.50

0.18

-2.82**

Neutral: White

-0.18

0.18

-1.00___

Note: CTNES = Counterfactual thinking for negative events scale
*p < .05, **p < .01,***p < .001

Table 12: Study 2 Final Legal Model
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables
Predicting Legal Blame (N = 138)
Legal Blame
Variable

B

SE B

β

(Intercept)

0.91

0.23

4.00***

Valence: Neutral

-0.03

0.07

-0.45___

Race: Black

0.43

0.27

1.61___

Race: White

0.21

0.28

0.75___

Counterfactual

0.52

0.05

11.03***

Black: CF

-0.12

0.06

-1.91*__

White: CF

0.07

0.06

0.29___

Note: CTNES = Counterfactual thinking for negative events scale
*p < .05, **p < .01,***p < .001
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